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Saturday, September 26, 202668 days to the Dice Letter centennialNo physics degree or shared belief required.
GOD PLAYS DICE™The magazine of big questions

THE QUESTION LIBRARY HOW WE KNOW

What are the most common thinking traps, and how do we avoid them?

Every human mind takes shortcuts, including the minds of scientists and of the people who wrote this page, so here are the best-known traps and the habits that help.

Line drawing of a twin-engine propeller plane seen from above, with red dots scattered over the wings, the middle of the body and the tail, and almost none on the engines or the nose.
A made-up damage pattern on a World War II bomber. The red dots show hits on planes that made it home. Planes hit in the empty spots, such as the engines, were more likely to be the ones that never came back to be counted.Martin Grandjean (vector), McGeddon (picture), US Air Force (hit plot concept), via Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 4.0Image source ↗

THE SHORT ANSWER

Everyone falls into thinking traps, including scientists. The best known include confirmation bias (favoring evidence that fits what we already believe), motivated reasoning (reaching the answer we want), judging by what comes to mind easily, ignoring how common something is, seeing patterns in random noise, and survivorship bias (studying only the winners). You can’t switch these off. But habits help: look for what would prove you wrong, ask for the numbers, and let other people check your work.

  • In a 1960 test, only 6 of 29 young adults found a simple number rule without first announcing a wrong one, and many tested only cases that fit their guess.
  • In 1974, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman showed that mental shortcuts usually work but lead to errors we can predict.
  • In a 1949 class, every student got the same personality sketch, and only 5 of 39 rated it below 4 on a 0 to 5 scale.
  • In World War II, the statistician Abraham Wald worked out how vulnerable planes were using damage on the ones that made it home.
  • Not every famous finding holds up: two large team tests found little or no sign of the claimed “ego depletion” effect.

WHERE THE EVIDENCE STANDS

How sure are we?

  • EstablishedPeople tend to seek and favor evidence that fits what they already believe.Wason’s 1960 number-rule experiment; Raymond Nickerson’s 1998 review in Review of General Psychology calls confirmation bias ubiquitous and documents it in many settings.
  • Supported, still debatedHow easily examples come to mind shapes how common we think something is.Tversky and Kahneman (Science, 1974) describe the availability heuristic with famous-name lists and words with the letter r. Repeats of the famous-names test found moderate (1995) and smaller (2001) effects, and a 1998 study found letter-position judgments generally followed real proportions.
  • Supported, still debatedPeople often give base rates, meaning how common something is to begin with, too little weight.Tversky and Kahneman’s 1974 engineer-and-lawyer experiment showed it clearly. But Jonathan Koehler’s 1996 review in Behavioral and Brain Sciences finds that the literature does not support the idea that people routinely ignore base rates: they are almost always used, to a degree that depends on how the problem is presented.
  • EstablishedVague, general statements about personality feel as if they were written just for us.Forer’s 1949 classroom demonstration; a 1985 review by Dickson and Kelly found acceptance of such profiles depends on how relevant and favorable they seem.
  • Not supportedSelf-control reliably runs down after a short effort, like fuel in a tank.A 23-lab preregistered replication (2,141 people, 2016) found an effect near zero, and a 36-lab test in 2021 found no evidence for it in its planned analyses.
What the labels mean

WHAT WE DON’T KNOW YET

Researchers still debate how big some biases are outside the lab, and how much training can reduce them for good. Some effects that once looked solid have shrunk under larger tests, and more may follow.

WHAT WOULD CHANGE THIS ANSWER

Large, careful replications that failed to find confirmation bias or the availability effect would change this answer. So would strong evidence that simple training removes these biases for good.

Everyone has thinking traps. They are not signs of low intelligence. They are shortcuts the human mind uses all the time, and most of the time they work well. But they also lead to mistakes we can predict. Scientists fall into them. So do experts in many fields, and so do the writers of this page.

People ask about thinking traps for many reasons. Some want to judge a video or a viral post. Some are rethinking what they were raised to believe, or wondering why a relative sees the world so differently. Some want to check their own reasoning. All of these are good reasons to learn how our minds slip.

Here are the traps that show up most often. Confirmation bias is favoring evidence that fits what we already believe. Motivated reasoning is reaching the conclusion we want and then finding reasons for it. The availability heuristic means judging how common something is by how easily examples come to mind. Base-rate neglect means forgetting how common something is to begin with. Patternicity is seeing meaningful patterns in random noise. The Barnum effect is feeling that a vague description was written just for you. And survivorship bias is drawing lessons only from the winners, because the losers are not around to be counted.

These are well studied. In a classic 1960 experiment, most of the bright young adults tested announced at least one wrong rule, and people typically tested only cases that fit their guess. In 1974, two psychologists showed that mental shortcuts make people misjudge how often things happen.

You can’t switch these traps off. Even knowing about them does not make you immune. But habits help. Ask what would prove you wrong. Ask for the numbers. Ask who is missing from the story. And let other people check your work, because that is how science catches its own mistakes.

THE LONG ANSWER

What is confirmation bias, and how does it fool smart people?

Confirmation bias is the habit of seeking or reading evidence in ways that favor what we already believe. In a 1998 review, Raymond Nickerson called it “a ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises,” meaning it shows up almost everywhere.

The classic test came from the psychologist P. C. Wason, working in London, in 1960. He told people that the numbers 2, 4, 6 fit a simple rule. Their job was to find the rule by making up new sets of three numbers. After each set, Wason said whether it fit. A common guess, as Nickerson describes it, was “successive even numbers.” People typically tested only sets that fit their guess, such as 8, 10, 12. Every answer came back “yes,” which seemed to confirm it. But the real rule was broader: any three numbers in increasing order. Only 6 of 29 people found it without first announcing a wrong rule. The trick is that a “yes” to a set that fits your guess can’t show that your guess is wrong. Only a test your guess says should fail, such as 1, 2, 3 or 5, 10, 20, can do that. Both get a “yes” under the real rule, which shows the guess is too narrow.

Confirmation bias is close to motivated reasoning. In a 1990 review, the psychologist Ziva Kunda reviewed considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions they want to reach. The review also found a limit: people can only do this as far as they can build reasons that seem sensible. Nickerson describes a related finding. Two people with opposite views can read the same evidence and both come away more sure of their own side.

Smart people are not protected. In their famous 1974 paper in Science, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman wrote that “experienced researchers are also prone to the same biases” when they think intuitively. And in a 2002 study, Emily Pronin and her colleagues found that people see bias much more in others than in themselves. They called this the bias blind spot.

Why do vivid examples and missing numbers mislead us?

Tversky and Kahneman described the availability heuristic: we judge how common something is by how easily examples come to mind. That often works, because common things are usually easier to recall. But other things affect memory too. In one experiment, people heard a list of well-known men and women. Whichever sex had the more famous names seemed more numerous, even when it wasn’t. In another, people guessed whether English words more often start with r or have r as the third letter. Most chose the first, because words are easier to search by their first letter. Yet r is more common in the third spot.

These classic demonstrations have a mixed record. A 1995 repeat of the famous-names test found a moderate effect, but a 2001 repeat found a smaller one. And a 1998 study by a team in Germany noted that the letter result had almost never been repeated in print. In their own three studies, people’s judgments of whether a letter is more common first or second in words generally matched the real proportions.

Tversky and Kahneman’s 1974 paper also described base-rate neglect. People read short descriptions said to come from a group of engineers and lawyers. One group was told there were 70 engineers and 30 lawyers. The other was told the reverse. Those numbers should have changed people’s guesses a lot, but the two groups gave almost the same answers. Even for a description that said nothing useful about the man’s job, people rated the odds of an engineer at 50-50, whatever the mix.

In a 1996 review, Jonathan Koehler argued that the base-rate problem has been oversold. He found that people almost always use base rates to some degree, and use them more when the numbers are given as simple counts. In short, people often give base rates too little weight, depending on how a problem is framed.

Why do we see patterns and messages that aren’t there?

Writing in Scientific American in 2008, Michael Shermer gave the name patternicity to the tendency to find meaningful patterns in meaningless noise. Psychologists also use the word apophenia, a leaning toward false-positive errors. Shermer points to a 2008 paper in which the biologists Kevin Foster and Hanna Kokko built a simple model. It shows how natural selection can favor this habit when missing a real pattern costs more than believing a false one. Shermer’s example: if an animal treats a rustle in the grass as a predator and it turns out to be the wind, it loses little; if it makes the opposite mistake, it might not survive. Where the example stops fitting: it is about split-second reactions to danger, while many of the patterns people argue about today are beliefs we have time to check.

The Barnum effect is a close cousin. In 1949, the psychologist Bertram Forer gave his class a personality test. A week later, each of the 39 students got a sketch with their own name on it. Every sketch was the same, built from general lines such as “You have a tendency to be critical of yourself.” Forer noted the lines came largely from a newsstand astrology book. Asked how well the sketch revealed their personality on a scale of 0 to 5, only 5 students rated it below 4. A 1985 review of later studies found that people accept such profiles more when they seem relevant and flattering. Our answer on astrology looks at how this plays out in horoscopes.

What is survivorship bias, and where does it trick us?

Survivorship bias means drawing conclusions only from the cases that made it through, because the ones that didn’t are not there to be seen. The most famous example comes from World War II. At Columbia University’s Statistical Research Group, the statistician Abraham Wald worked on estimating how vulnerable aircraft were, using data from planes that came back. The hard part, as a 1984 account of his work explains, was that the damage on downed aircraft could not be observed. Planes hit in the most dangerous places were more likely to be missing from the count. Wald built methods to reason about those missing planes. In that account’s worked example, which uses made-up numbers, the engine area turned out to be the most vulnerable part.

The same trap shows up in daily life. If we only hear from people who quit school and got rich, we learn the wrong lesson. Ask: who didn’t make it, and why can’t I see them?

What is the strongest objection?

The strongest objection is that psychology has had a replication problem, so maybe these biases are overblown too. Some famous findings did fail. The idea of “ego depletion” said that self-control runs down like fuel after a short effort. But a 2016 test across 23 labs with 2,141 people found an effect near zero. A 2021 test across 36 labs also found no evidence for it in its planned analyses.

But a failure in one place does not sink everything. Confirmation bias has been found again and again in many settings, as Nickerson’s review shows. And when a 2014 project retested 13 classic and newer psychology effects across 36 samples, 10 replicated consistently, while two did not replicate.

What do people often get wrong?

“Biases are always bad.” Tversky and Kahneman called these shortcuts “highly economical and usually effective.” The trouble comes when we trust them where they fail.

“Knowing about biases makes me immune.” Pronin’s studies suggest the opposite risk: we spot bias in others and miss it in ourselves.

“Only other people fall for this.” Believers and skeptics, experts and beginners all use the same mind. Nickerson notes that science succeeds less because each scientist doubts their own ideas and more because scientists are highly motivated to show that other scientists’ ideas are false.

How can you check yourself?

  1. Ask what would prove you wrong. Then go look for it, the way a good test of Wason’s rule tries numbers that might get a “no.”
  2. Consider the other side. Nickerson reports that people lean on this trap less when asked to think of other explanations.
  3. Ask for the base rate. How common is this to begin with? A striking story is one case, not a number.
  4. Ask who is missing. Who failed, dropped out or never came back to be counted?
  5. Test a pattern on new data. A real pattern should predict something you have not seen yet.
  6. Watch for statements that fit anyone. If a reading would fit your friend just as well, it is not telling you much.
  7. Notice when you want an answer. Strong hopes or fears are the moment to slow down.
  8. Let others check your work. Share your reasons with someone who disagrees.

For a quick routine you can use on any viral post, see our guide How to Check a Viral Science Claim in Five Minutes. The answer stays the same: these traps are real, well studied, and part of every human mind.

THREE THINGS TO REMEMBER

  1. Everyone uses mental shortcuts, and they fail in ways we can predict.
  2. Look for what would prove you wrong, and ask who is missing from the story.
  3. Confirmation bias is well established, but some famous findings shrank or failed in larger tests.

WHERE THE AUTHOR’S RESEARCH TOUCHES THIS

Author’s hypothesis. In the book’s Introduction, Ricardo Maldonado, author of GOD PLAYS DICE, describes a falsifiable hypothesis that our Big Bang may be the aftershock of a higher-dimensional event. On this site it goes by the name HD-Blast. It is an Author’s hypothesis, not an established result. Two passages in the book deal with traps on this page.

In Chapter 5, the author sets aside a number pattern he has explored in particle masses. He calls it “a line of thought rather than a claim” and writes that with enough freedom, you can find a pattern almost anywhere. A real pattern, he argues, has to predict new measurements, not only explain old ones. In Chapter 11, under the heading “The Hardest Result to Correct Is Your Own,” he writes that correction is hardest when the idea is yours, and that a corrected claim is not a corrected human being. Whether HD-Blast survives is up to the data and to other people checking it.

WORDS WORTH KNOWING

Heuristic
A mental shortcut or rule of thumb that gives quick answers. Heuristics usually work but can lead to predictable errors.
Base rate
How common something is to begin with, before you learn any details about a particular case.
Replication
Repeating a study, often with new people and new labs, to see whether the result holds up.
Preregistered
A study whose plan and analysis were written down and made public before the data came in, so the results can’t be shaped after the fact.
Apophenia
A tendency to see meaningful connections in random events, a leaning toward false-positive errors.

Sources & further reading

  1. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman) ↗Representativeness, availability, anchoring; “highly economical and usually effective” but “systematic and predictable errors”; 70/30 engineers and lawyers, Dick description judged .5 either way; famous-names lists; words with r first vs third; “Experienced researchers are also prone to the same biases” when thinking intuitively. Full text read from the JSTOR copy hosted at https://sites.socsci.uci.edu/~bskyrms/bio/readings/tversky_k_heuristics_biases.pdf. Replication record: McKelvie, Perceptual and Motor Skills (1995), doi:10.2466/pms.1995.81.3f.1331 (famous-names effect d = 0.53); McKelvie and Drumheller (2001), doi:10.2466/pms.2001.92.2.507 (smaller effect, d = 0.34); Sedlmeier, Hertwig and Gigerenzer, JEP: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 24 (1998), doi:10.1037/0278-7393.24.3.754 (no single published replication of the letter result except a one-page article; across 3 studies letter-position judgments generally followed actual proportions; full text from the Max Planck PuRe repository).
  2. On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task (P. C. Wason) ↗2, 4, 6 rule; the concept was “three numbers in increasing order of magnitude”; 6 of 29 reached the correct rule without previous incorrect ones. Full text read from the copy at web.mit.edu (curhan/www/docs/Articles/biases).
  3. Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises (Raymond S. Nickerson) ↗Definition; Wason task and positive-test strategy (Klayman and Ha 1987); two people with conflicting views both strengthened by the same evidence (Lord, Ross and Lepper 1979); asking people to consider alternatives reduces the positive-test tendency (Baron, Beattie and Hershey 1988); science succeeds less through self-criticism than through scientists testing each other’s hypotheses. Full text from https://pages.ucsd.edu/~mckenzie/nickersonConfirmationBias.pdf.
  4. The Case for Motivated Reasoning (Ziva Kunda) ↗Abstract (PubMed 2270237): considerable evidence people arrive at conclusions they want, constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications. Also: Pronin, Lin and Ross, “The Bias Blind Spot,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28 (2002), doi:10.1177/0146167202286008.
  5. The base rate fallacy reconsidered (Jonathan J. Koehler) ↗Abstract: the literature (including the lawyer–engineer problem) does not support the conventional wisdom that people routinely ignore base rates; base rates are almost always used; degree depends on task structure and representation; used more when frequentist or implicitly learned.
  6. Patternicity: Finding Meaningful Patterns in Meaningless Noise (Michael Shermer) ↗Shermer names the tendency patternicity (“I call it”); type I and type II errors; rustle-in-the-grass example; Foster and Kokko’s model. Also: Foster and Kokko, Proc. R. Soc. B 276 (2009; published online Sept. 2008, which Shermer calls “a September paper”), doi:10.1098/rspb.2008.0981; Blain et al., “Apophenia as the disposition to false positives,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology (2020), doi:10.1037/abn0000504.
  7. The fallacy of personal validation (Bertram R. Forer) ↗39 students; identical 13-item sketch a week after the test; items largely from a newsstand astrology book; only five ratings of the sketch below 4 on a 0 to 5 scale. Read by OCR of the scan hosted by Astronomy magazine (https://www.astronomy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Forer-fallacy-of-personal-validation-1949.pdf). Also: Dickson and Kelly, Psychological Reports 57 (1985), doi:10.2466/pr0.1985.57.2.367 (acceptance depends on relevance and favorability).
  8. Abraham Wald’s Work on Aircraft Survivability (Marc Mangel and Francisco J. Samaniego) ↗Wald at the Statistical Research Group estimated aircraft vulnerability from survivors’ data; data on downed aircraft unobservable; methods used in World War II, Korea and Vietnam; engine area most vulnerable in the worked example. Read by OCR of the scan at https://people.ucsc.edu/~msmangel/Wald.pdf. MacTutor biography (https://mathshistory.st-andrews.ac.uk/Biographies/Wald/): Statistics Research Group at Columbia.
  9. A Multilab Preregistered Replication of the Ego-Depletion Effect (Hagger and colleagues) ↗23 labs, 2,141 participants, d = 0.04 with a confidence interval including zero. Also: Vohs et al., Psychological Science (2021), doi:10.1177/0956797621989733 (36 labs, 3,531 people, preregistered analyses found no evidence); Klein et al., “Investigating Variation in Replicability,” Social Psychology 45 (2014), doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000178 (13 effects, 36 samples, 10 replicated consistently, 1 weak, 2 did not replicate).
  10. GOD PLAYS DICE, Volume OneIntroduction: “a specific, falsifiable hypothesis about the Big Bang — that it may be the aftershock of a higher-dimensional event.” Chapter 5: the lepton-mass pattern called “a line of thought rather than a claim”; with enough freedom “you can find something almost anywhere”; a real pattern needs a framework that predicts new measurements. Chapter 11, section “The Hardest Result to Correct Is Your Own”: a corrected claim is not a corrected human being.

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