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Saturday, September 26, 202668 days to the Dice Letter centennialNo physics degree or shared belief required.
GOD PLAYS DICE™The magazine of big questions

THE QUESTION LIBRARY MIND & MORTALITY

Is free will real, or does the brain decide before we do?

A famous experiment seemed to show that the brain makes our choices before we know it, so here is what it really found, what later work showed, and what is still open.

Close-up of a man wearing a white mesh cap dotted with round electrodes and gray wires, with one more electrode stuck to the skin beside his eye.
An EEG cap holds sensors against the scalp to record the brain’s electrical activity. The readiness potential at the center of the free will debate is measured this way.Chris Hope, via Wikimedia Commons (originally on Flickr) · CC BY 2.0Image source ↗

THE SHORT ANSWER

Nobody knows yet, but the famous brain experiments do not show that your brain decides before you do. In a 1983 study, Benjamin Libet found a slow brain signal that built up before people reported feeling the urge to move. Later work suggests that buildup may be random brain noise, not a hidden choice. Whether free will is real also depends on what free will means. In a 2020 survey, most responding philosophers favored the view that free will can exist even if every event is fixed by earlier causes.

  • In Libet’s 1983 study of five volunteers, a slow brain signal began at least several hundred milliseconds before people reported the urge to move.
  • In 2012, Aaron Schurger and colleagues showed that random ups and downs in brain activity, averaged together, can reproduce that slow rise.
  • In a 2019 study, the rise showed up before random key presses but not before choices about which charity would get a real donation.
  • In a 2020 survey of 1,785 philosophers, 59.2% of those who answered favored compatibilism, the view that free will can exist even if every event is fixed by earlier causes; 18.8% favored libertarian free will, and 11.2% no free will.
  • Quantum physics is well tested, but experts disagree on whether it is truly random, and random events alone would not make a choice yours.

WHERE THE EVIDENCE STANDS

How sure are we?

  • EstablishedIn simple lab tasks, averaged brain activity starts to rise before the moment people report deciding to move.Libet and colleagues (Brain, 1983) found the averaged readiness potential began about 350 ms before the reported urge in fully spontaneous series; a 2021 review in Trends in Cognitive Sciences says many replications agree on when people report the urge.
  • Not supportedLibet’s experiments proved that the brain makes our decisions before we know about them.The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy says Libet’s reading has come in for severe criticism and neuroscientists are uncertain what the signal means; the 2021 review concludes that the signal fails to support the classic inference that conscious will does nothing, even if the newer models turn out wrong.
  • Supported, still debatedThe slow buildup before a movement may come from random brain noise, not from a hidden early decision.A model by Schurger, Sitt and Dehaene (PNAS, 2012) reproduced the signal and passed a new test; Maoz and colleagues (eLife, 2019) found it absent before meaningful choices. The 2021 review notes a few studies favor the older reading.
  • Not supportedQuantum randomness shows that our choices are free.The Stanford Encyclopedia notes there is no consensus on how to interpret quantum theory, that brain science gives little evidence either way on randomness in our choices, and that pure chance raises a problem of luck rather than control.
  • Beyond scienceFree will can exist even if every event follows from earlier causes and the laws of nature.This is compatibilism, a claim about what free will means. The 2020 PhilPapers Survey found 59.2% of responding philosophers accepting or leaning toward it, 18.8% toward libertarian free will and 11.2% toward no free will.
What the labels mean

WHAT WE DON’T KNOW YET

Nobody knows yet what the readiness potential really reflects. We also don’t know if true randomness plays any part in the brain’s choices. And we don’t know how tests with a finger lift carry over to big life choices.

WHAT WOULD CHANGE THIS ANSWER

Tests that could reliably predict people’s real, thought-out choices long before they felt they had decided would weaken the case for conscious control. But no test alone can settle what free will means. That part of the question is philosophical: it turns on what kind of control matters.

Nobody knows yet whether free will is real. But one popular claim can be checked: that brain research proves your brain decides before you do. The famous experiments behind that claim do not show it. Many researchers now read them in a very different way.

People ask about free will for many reasons. Some worry that science has turned us into machines. Some grew up in faith traditions that teach we are free and responsible for our choices. Some just saw a video saying their brain makes choices without them. All of these are fair reasons to ask.

Here is the core story. In a 1983 study, the scientist Benjamin Libet asked five volunteers to flex a finger or wrist whenever they felt like it. They watched a fast clock and later reported when they first felt the urge. Sensors on the scalp picked up a slow electrical rise, called the readiness potential. It started several hundred milliseconds before the moment people reported. To many, that looked like the brain deciding first.

Later work challenged that reading. In 2012, Aaron Schurger and his team built a model showing that the rise could come from random ups and downs in brain activity that happen to tip over a line. If so, the real decision to move now comes late, close to when people feel the urge. In 2019, another team found the rise before random key presses but not before choices that mattered, such as which charity should get a real donation.

The bigger puzzle is what free will means. Some philosophers say free will fits with a world where physical laws fix everything. Others say it needs a truly open future. Still others say we have no free will at all. Science can inform this debate, but it cannot settle the definitions. That is why we label the headline question an Open question.

THE LONG ANSWER

What did the famous brain experiments actually show?

The readiness potential, known before Libet’s work, is a slow electrical rise recorded with EEG (electroencephalography), sensors worn on the scalp. Averaged over many movements, it builds up slowly before movement begins.

In a 1983 study in the journal Brain, Benjamin Libet and colleagues added a twist. Five volunteers watched a spot circle a clock face and made a quick movement whenever they wished. Afterward, each person reported where the spot was when they first felt the wish to move. In the sets of trials where people said every movement felt spontaneous, the main rise began about 350 milliseconds, on average, before that reported moment. Libet concluded that the brain’s start of a freely chosen act “can begin unconsciously,” before any awareness that a decision has been made.

Libet himself saw limits to his conclusion. As a 2021 review in Trends in Cognitive Sciences explains, he suggested that people might still veto, or cancel, an act at the last moment, an idea often called “free won’t.” The review adds that later studies make this idea look untenable, because vetoes are also preceded by a readiness potential. It calls his second point more helpful: many actions come from slower, conscious thinking.

In 2008, a brain-scan study by Soon and colleagues reported predicting a decision up to 10 seconds before people were aware of it. The same review notes those predictions were only a little better than a random guess.

Why many researchers now read the signal differently

The catch: the readiness potential is an average built only from stretches of brain activity that ended in a movement.

In 2012, Aaron Schurger, Jacobo Sitt and Stanislas Dehaene built a simple model of this. As an analogy, picture waves at a beach, with a line drawn in the sand. Each time a wave happens to reach the line, the person moves. If you line up all those moments and average the waves before them, you get a smooth rise, even though no wave planned to reach the line. The analogy breaks in one way: in the model, the instruction to move adds a small, steady push, so it is not pure chance. The model matched the real signal and passed a new test: fast reactions to clicks at random times also came after a similar slow rise. In this account, the real neural decision to move now comes late, perhaps about 150 milliseconds before the movement, close to when people report the urge.

In 2019, Uri Maoz and colleagues tested choices that mattered. In some rounds, people picked which of two charities should get money, and a lottery meant each choice could lead to a real $1,020 donation. In other rounds, the key press made no difference. The readiness potential showed up before the meaningless presses but was “strikingly absent” before the meaningful ones.

The 2021 review sums up: if these newer models are right, the timing of the readiness potential cannot show that we lack conscious free will, and even if they are wrong, the signal still fails to support the old conclusion that conscious will does nothing. It also notes that a few studies support the older reading, and it lists which model is correct as an open question. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy says that after extensive study, neuroscientists are uncertain what the signal means. For more on the brain and awareness, see What Is Consciousness?

What do philosophers mean by free will?

Even perfect brain data would not settle the question, because people mean different things by free will. The Stanford Encyclopedia calls it a significant kind of control over one’s actions. The debate is over what that control requires. It starts with determinism: the idea that everything that happens results from the laws of nature and the state of the world long ago. Does that leave room for free will?

  • Compatibilists say yes. In the classic version described in the encyclopedia’s entry on compatibilism, you are free when you can do what you want without being forced. Some newer versions say free actions are the ones that respond to good reasons.
  • Libertarians (nothing to do with politics here) say no. For them, free will requires that determinism be false, so more than one future is truly open when you choose.
  • Free will skeptics say we lack the kind of free will that would make us deeply deserve praise or blame. The older version, hard determinism, has few defenders today, the encyclopedia notes. A newer version, called hard incompatibilism and defended by philosophers such as Derk Pereboom, says we lack that kind of free will whether or not determinism is true.

In the 2020 PhilPapers Survey, 1,785 professional philosophers took part. Of those who answered this question, 59.2% accepted or leaned toward compatibilism, 18.8% toward libertarianism and 11.2% toward no free will. A vote does not make a view right, but it shows the question is far from closed.

Religious thinkers have wrestled with this for centuries. The Stanford Encyclopedia notes that much Western writing on free will was done within a theological framework. It points to thinkers such as Al-Ghazali, Aquinas, Scotus and, later, Jonathan Edwards in 1754. Believers, skeptics and the never-religious all have a place in this long conversation.

Does quantum randomness make room for free will?

Many people hope quantum physics, the physics of atoms and particles, can help. It usually gives only the odds of an outcome. If nature is not fixed in advance, maybe our choices are not either.

It weakens strict determinism, but does not refute it. The encyclopedia’s entry on skepticism about moral responsibility says quantum mechanics has led many to doubt that everything is determined, yet determinism has not been refuted. The entry on nondeterministic theories of free will adds that quantum theory is very well confirmed, but there is nothing approaching a consensus on how to interpret it.

It may not reach the brain. Libertarians need openness in the right places, at the moment of choice. On that, the same entry says, our current understanding of the brain gives “little evidence one way or the other.” Some argue that everyday brain activity runs on cause and effect even if atoms are chancy.

Chance is not control. Philosophers call this the problem of luck. If a choice comes down to chance, then whether it happened may not have been up to you. It was luck, as if nature rolled dice.

So quantum randomness offers, at most, an opening. Many compatibilists think it is not needed at all. For more on whether nature truly plays dice, see Is the Universe Truly Random?

What is the strongest objection?

One of the strongest challenges to free will does not come from brain scans. The Stanford Encyclopedia calls it the most radical argument of its kind: the philosopher Galen Strawson’s case, built on reasoning alone, that free will is impossible. You act the way you do because of how you are, mentally speaking. To be truly responsible for a choice, you would have to be responsible for how you are. But to choose how you are, you would already need a character and reasons to choose with, and so on forever.

The encyclopedia also notes evidence that our choices can be swayed by factors we are not aware of. The social psychologist Daniel Wegner argued that the experience of consciously willing is “an illusion.”

Defenders of free will reply. The philosopher Alfred Mele argues that freedom belongs mainly to our actions, and only secondarily to the characters they come from. Mele and Timothy O’Connor suggest that freedom comes in degrees and grows over time, as our own past choices shape who we are.

What do people often get wrong?

  • “Libet proved free will is an illusion.” Libet timed movements made at arbitrary moments, with no reason to pick one moment over another. His reading has come in for severe criticism, and later models read the signal differently.
  • “Scientists can read your choices 10 seconds early.” Those predictions were barely better than chance.
  • “Random means free.” A coin flip inside your head would not make a choice more yours.
  • “Without free will, nothing matters.” Spinoza denied free will, yet the encyclopedia notes he was keen to deny that this has the dire effects many assume.

How can you check this yourself?

  • Ask what kind of choice was studied. Was it a random finger lift, or a decision with reasons and stakes? Maoz and colleagues found the two can look different in the brain.
  • Ask what “predict” means. Better than chance is not the same as mind reading.
  • Remember that curves are averages. The 2021 review warns that a smooth average may not match what happens in any single trial.
  • Ask which free will is meant. A headline that says free will is dead usually means one definition.

The answer stays the same. The famous experiments do not show that your brain decides before you do, and whether free will is real is still an open question.

THREE THINGS TO REMEMBER

  1. The famous brain signal may reflect random noise, not a hidden early decision.
  2. Whether free will is real depends partly on what free will means.
  3. Randomness alone would not make a choice free.

WHERE THE AUTHOR’S RESEARCH TOUCHES THIS

Author’s hypothesis. A reader might wonder whether a book called GOD PLAYS DICE claims that randomness gives us free will. It does not. Ricardo Maldonado, author of GOD PLAYS DICE, uses the title as a metaphor: in the book, “God” is shorthand for the deep laws of nature, and “dice” is shorthand for quantum events, which are random but follow precise rules. The book’s notes say the title is philosophical shorthand, not a claim that one experiment has settled every question about determinism. The book does not offer a theory of free will.

In Chapter 10, the author writes that randomness does not mean chaos: a die can land unpredictably and still obey strict rules. He offers that as a way of picturing the universe, not as an answer to the free will debate.

WORDS WORTH KNOWING

Readiness potential
A slow electrical rise, seen in averaged EEG recordings, that comes before a voluntary movement. What it reflects is still debated.
EEG (electroencephalography)
A way to record the brain’s electrical activity with sensors placed on the scalp.
Determinism
The idea that everything that happens is the result of the laws of nature and the state of the world in the past.
Compatibilism
The view that free will can exist even if determinism is true.
Libertarian free will
The view that we have free will and that it requires determinism to be false. It has nothing to do with political libertarianism.
Hard incompatibilism
A free will skeptic’s view that we lack the free will needed to deeply deserve praise or blame, whether or not determinism is true.

Sources & further reading

  1. Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential) ↗Five subjects, at least six sessions each; onset of the RP preceded reported intention (W) by at least several hundred ms; in series with type II RPs, by about 350 ms on average (minimum about 150 ms); conclusion that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous, freely voluntary act “can begin unconsciously,” before any recallable awareness of a decision. Abstract read via PubMed (PMID 6640273).
  2. An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement ↗Leaky stochastic accumulator reproduces the RP; confirmed prediction with unpredictable interruptions (clicks); neural decision to move proposed near −150 ms, coinciding with reported awareness; mean reported urge −150 ms in their data. Full text read on PubMed Central (PMC3479453).
  3. Neural precursors of decisions that matter: an ERP study of deliberate and arbitrary choice ↗Donation task with non-profit organizations; RPs found for arbitrary decisions but “strikingly absent” for deliberate ones; lottery design meant each deliberate choice could lead to a real $1,020 donation; 20 participants, data from 18 analyzed. Full text on PubMed Central (PMC6809608).
  4. What Is the Readiness Potential? ↗Libet task history (fingers and/or wrist, rotating clock); the veto idea (“free won’t”), which later studies make “seem untenable”; Libet’s “more helpful” point about longer conscious deliberation; fMRI predictions (refs 22 and 28, Soon et al. 2008 and 2013) “only marginally better than a random guess” (Soon et al., Nature Neuroscience 2008, doi:10.1038/nn.2112, abstract: outcomes encoded up to 10 s before awareness); RP built only from epochs ending in movement; a few studies challenge the late-decision view; which model is correct listed as an outstanding question; conclusion that one cannot infer we lack conscious free will from the RP’s timing, and that even if these models are mistaken the RP would still fail to support the classic inference. Author manuscript read on PubMed Central (PMC8192467).
  5. Free Will (Timothy O’Connor and Christopher Franklin) ↗Free will as “a significant kind of control over one’s actions”; Strawson’s argument, “the most radical a priori argument,” that free will is impossible, and replies by Mele (freedom principally a feature of actions) and O’Connor (degrees that grow over time); evidence of unconscious influences; Wegner’s “an illusion”; Libet’s interpretation severely criticized and neuroscientists uncertain what the RP signifies; Spinoza; theists commonly presume humans are free and responsible; theological framework, Edwards (1754), Al-Ghazali, Aquinas, Scotus.
  6. Compatibilism (Michael McKenna and D. Justin Coates) ↗Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism; determinism described as everything following from the laws of nature and the state of the world in the distant past; classical view (Hobbes: doing what one wills without impediment); reasons-responsive compatibilism.
  7. Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will (Clarke, Capes and Swenson) ↗Incompatibilists: we act freely only if determinism is false; the problem of luck; quantum theory “very well confirmed” but “nothing approaching a consensus” on interpretation; brain science gives “little evidence one way or the other” on indeterminism at the right junctures. Also consulted: SEP “Causal Determinism” (Carl Hoefer, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/) on deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics.
  8. Skepticism About Moral Responsibility (Gregg Caruso) ↗Hard determinism defined and said to have very few defenders today; determinism not refuted by physics; Honderich’s “determinism-where-it-matters”; hard incompatibilism holds we lack basic desert moral responsibility whether reality is deterministic or not.
  9. Philosophers on Philosophy: The 2020 PhilPapers Survey ↗Survey run Oct. 15 to Nov. 16, 2020; 1,785 of 7,685 targeted philosophers (faculty in BA-granting departments in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK and the US, plus English-publishing philosophers elsewhere) completed it; free will: compatibilism 59.2%, libertarianism 18.8%, no free will 11.2%, other 11.4% (accept or lean toward, excluding skips and “insufficiently familiar”).
  10. GOD PLAYS DICE, Volume OneIntroduction: the title is a metaphor, God is shorthand for the deep laws of nature and dice for quantum events, random but constrained by precise rules. Chapter 10: randomness does not mean chaos; a die can be random and still obey strict rules. Endnotes: the title is philosophical shorthand, not a claim that one experiment has settled every question about determinism, causality or interpretation. The book does not use the phrase “free will.”

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