Mind & MortalityExplainer
What Is Consciousness?
Science can map which brain activity goes with experience. Why any of it feels like something from the inside remains one of the great open questions.
THE QUESTION LIBRARY MIND & MORTALITY
A famous experiment seemed to show that the brain makes our choices before we know it, so here is what it really found, what later work showed, and what is still open.

THE SHORT ANSWER
Nobody knows yet, but the famous brain experiments do not show that your brain decides before you do. In a 1983 study, Benjamin Libet found a slow brain signal that built up before people reported feeling the urge to move. Later work suggests that buildup may be random brain noise, not a hidden choice. Whether free will is real also depends on what free will means. In a 2020 survey, most responding philosophers favored the view that free will can exist even if every event is fixed by earlier causes.
WHERE THE EVIDENCE STANDS
WHAT WE DON’T KNOW YET
Nobody knows yet what the readiness potential really reflects. We also don’t know if true randomness plays any part in the brain’s choices. And we don’t know how tests with a finger lift carry over to big life choices.
WHAT WOULD CHANGE THIS ANSWER
Tests that could reliably predict people’s real, thought-out choices long before they felt they had decided would weaken the case for conscious control. But no test alone can settle what free will means. That part of the question is philosophical: it turns on what kind of control matters.
Nobody knows yet whether free will is real. But one popular claim can be checked: that brain research proves your brain decides before you do. The famous experiments behind that claim do not show it. Many researchers now read them in a very different way.
People ask about free will for many reasons. Some worry that science has turned us into machines. Some grew up in faith traditions that teach we are free and responsible for our choices. Some just saw a video saying their brain makes choices without them. All of these are fair reasons to ask.
Here is the core story. In a 1983 study, the scientist Benjamin Libet asked five volunteers to flex a finger or wrist whenever they felt like it. They watched a fast clock and later reported when they first felt the urge. Sensors on the scalp picked up a slow electrical rise, called the readiness potential. It started several hundred milliseconds before the moment people reported. To many, that looked like the brain deciding first.
Later work challenged that reading. In 2012, Aaron Schurger and his team built a model showing that the rise could come from random ups and downs in brain activity that happen to tip over a line. If so, the real decision to move now comes late, close to when people feel the urge. In 2019, another team found the rise before random key presses but not before choices that mattered, such as which charity should get a real donation.
The bigger puzzle is what free will means. Some philosophers say free will fits with a world where physical laws fix everything. Others say it needs a truly open future. Still others say we have no free will at all. Science can inform this debate, but it cannot settle the definitions. That is why we label the headline question an Open question.
The readiness potential, known before Libet’s work, is a slow electrical rise recorded with EEG (electroencephalography), sensors worn on the scalp. Averaged over many movements, it builds up slowly before movement begins.
In a 1983 study in the journal Brain, Benjamin Libet and colleagues added a twist. Five volunteers watched a spot circle a clock face and made a quick movement whenever they wished. Afterward, each person reported where the spot was when they first felt the wish to move. In the sets of trials where people said every movement felt spontaneous, the main rise began about 350 milliseconds, on average, before that reported moment. Libet concluded that the brain’s start of a freely chosen act “can begin unconsciously,” before any awareness that a decision has been made.
Libet himself saw limits to his conclusion. As a 2021 review in Trends in Cognitive Sciences explains, he suggested that people might still veto, or cancel, an act at the last moment, an idea often called “free won’t.” The review adds that later studies make this idea look untenable, because vetoes are also preceded by a readiness potential. It calls his second point more helpful: many actions come from slower, conscious thinking.
In 2008, a brain-scan study by Soon and colleagues reported predicting a decision up to 10 seconds before people were aware of it. The same review notes those predictions were only a little better than a random guess.
The catch: the readiness potential is an average built only from stretches of brain activity that ended in a movement.
In 2012, Aaron Schurger, Jacobo Sitt and Stanislas Dehaene built a simple model of this. As an analogy, picture waves at a beach, with a line drawn in the sand. Each time a wave happens to reach the line, the person moves. If you line up all those moments and average the waves before them, you get a smooth rise, even though no wave planned to reach the line. The analogy breaks in one way: in the model, the instruction to move adds a small, steady push, so it is not pure chance. The model matched the real signal and passed a new test: fast reactions to clicks at random times also came after a similar slow rise. In this account, the real neural decision to move now comes late, perhaps about 150 milliseconds before the movement, close to when people report the urge.
In 2019, Uri Maoz and colleagues tested choices that mattered. In some rounds, people picked which of two charities should get money, and a lottery meant each choice could lead to a real $1,020 donation. In other rounds, the key press made no difference. The readiness potential showed up before the meaningless presses but was “strikingly absent” before the meaningful ones.
The 2021 review sums up: if these newer models are right, the timing of the readiness potential cannot show that we lack conscious free will, and even if they are wrong, the signal still fails to support the old conclusion that conscious will does nothing. It also notes that a few studies support the older reading, and it lists which model is correct as an open question. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy says that after extensive study, neuroscientists are uncertain what the signal means. For more on the brain and awareness, see What Is Consciousness?
Even perfect brain data would not settle the question, because people mean different things by free will. The Stanford Encyclopedia calls it a significant kind of control over one’s actions. The debate is over what that control requires. It starts with determinism: the idea that everything that happens results from the laws of nature and the state of the world long ago. Does that leave room for free will?
In the 2020 PhilPapers Survey, 1,785 professional philosophers took part. Of those who answered this question, 59.2% accepted or leaned toward compatibilism, 18.8% toward libertarianism and 11.2% toward no free will. A vote does not make a view right, but it shows the question is far from closed.
Religious thinkers have wrestled with this for centuries. The Stanford Encyclopedia notes that much Western writing on free will was done within a theological framework. It points to thinkers such as Al-Ghazali, Aquinas, Scotus and, later, Jonathan Edwards in 1754. Believers, skeptics and the never-religious all have a place in this long conversation.
Many people hope quantum physics, the physics of atoms and particles, can help. It usually gives only the odds of an outcome. If nature is not fixed in advance, maybe our choices are not either.
It weakens strict determinism, but does not refute it. The encyclopedia’s entry on skepticism about moral responsibility says quantum mechanics has led many to doubt that everything is determined, yet determinism has not been refuted. The entry on nondeterministic theories of free will adds that quantum theory is very well confirmed, but there is nothing approaching a consensus on how to interpret it.
It may not reach the brain. Libertarians need openness in the right places, at the moment of choice. On that, the same entry says, our current understanding of the brain gives “little evidence one way or the other.” Some argue that everyday brain activity runs on cause and effect even if atoms are chancy.
Chance is not control. Philosophers call this the problem of luck. If a choice comes down to chance, then whether it happened may not have been up to you. It was luck, as if nature rolled dice.
So quantum randomness offers, at most, an opening. Many compatibilists think it is not needed at all. For more on whether nature truly plays dice, see Is the Universe Truly Random?
One of the strongest challenges to free will does not come from brain scans. The Stanford Encyclopedia calls it the most radical argument of its kind: the philosopher Galen Strawson’s case, built on reasoning alone, that free will is impossible. You act the way you do because of how you are, mentally speaking. To be truly responsible for a choice, you would have to be responsible for how you are. But to choose how you are, you would already need a character and reasons to choose with, and so on forever.
The encyclopedia also notes evidence that our choices can be swayed by factors we are not aware of. The social psychologist Daniel Wegner argued that the experience of consciously willing is “an illusion.”
Defenders of free will reply. The philosopher Alfred Mele argues that freedom belongs mainly to our actions, and only secondarily to the characters they come from. Mele and Timothy O’Connor suggest that freedom comes in degrees and grows over time, as our own past choices shape who we are.
The answer stays the same. The famous experiments do not show that your brain decides before you do, and whether free will is real is still an open question.
THREE THINGS TO REMEMBER
WHERE THE AUTHOR’S RESEARCH TOUCHES THIS
Author’s hypothesis. A reader might wonder whether a book called GOD PLAYS DICE claims that randomness gives us free will. It does not. Ricardo Maldonado, author of GOD PLAYS DICE, uses the title as a metaphor: in the book, “God” is shorthand for the deep laws of nature, and “dice” is shorthand for quantum events, which are random but follow precise rules. The book’s notes say the title is philosophical shorthand, not a claim that one experiment has settled every question about determinism. The book does not offer a theory of free will.
In Chapter 10, the author writes that randomness does not mean chaos: a die can land unpredictably and still obey strict rules. He offers that as a way of picturing the universe, not as an answer to the free will debate.
WORDS WORTH KNOWING
KEEP ASKING
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